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Abstract

Telemedicine has the potential to increase provider
efficiency [7] and mHealth may become an integral
part of the care delivery process. Mobile technologies
create the ability to improve patient health and to
minimize or even eliminate the need for office visits
for the routine management of some of the most
common chronic issues [8]. Agnihothri et al. quantify
using a Markov model the benefits of mHealth
interventions [9].
Unlike acute conditions, many of the most
common chronic conditions can be directly attributed
to specific patient behaviors. Patient behavior can be
composed of first, adherence to the treatment plan, and
second, implementation of lifestyle changes that are
either preventative or aid in management of the
chronic condition such as diet and exercise. Thus,
patient education is an important part of patient care.
Such tasks could be assigned to physician’s support
staff such as nurse practitioners, dieticians, and
exercise physiologists. By eliminating physicians’
unneeded involvement clinicians might be able to
spend more time with the patients who need them
most.
Thus, adopting mHealth in a clinical practice can
significantly change the composition of physician staff
and patient flow. This in turn can change the
economics associated with care delivery process
[8,10]. The objective of this paper is to evaluate the
impact of implementing mHealth technology on a
clinical practice. Specifically, we investigate “when is
it economical to switch to an mHealth-based practice
from a face-to-face, office visit-based clinical
practice?”

Chronic conditions place a high cost burden on the
healthcare system and deplete the quality of life for
millions of Americans. There is significant medical
literature that shows that continuous monitoring of
patient health at home with the addition of provider
support, improves patient health. Digital innovations
such as mHealth technology can be used to provide
efficient, effective, and patient centered healthcare.
However, implementing mHealth technology can
significantly change the composition of clinical staff
and patient flow. In this paper, we evaluate the tradeoffs of implementing mHealth technology in a clinical
practice.

1. Introduction
In the United States today, about half of all adults
have one or more chronic health conditions. Seven of
the top ten causes of death in 2014 were chronic
diseases [1]. Chronic disease and the delivery of care
to manage and treat these conditions may be the most
important issue facing our society today [2,3,4,5].
Mobile health (mHealth) is a broad term typically
used to describe the use of mobile technologies for the
delivery of health care. mHealth could help manage
chronic conditions such as hypertension and diabetes.
Unlike acute care, chronic healthcare is specially
characterized
by
recursive
physician-patient
interactions. Mobile technologies can help improve
the efficiencies in physician-patient interactions.
Instead of infrequent patient visits to the provider’s
office, patients can measure biometric information
(such as blood pressure and blood sugar levels) at
home and upload through a smartphone application
(see, for example, [6]) to a provider’s web-based
clinical decision support system. Providers can
remotely monitor patient health and can intervene
when necessary. This enables greater patient
engagement in the care delivery process and prompt
diagnosis and treatment of chronic conditions. As a
result, the number of unnecessary visits to physicians’
offices and emergency departments can be
substantially decreased, reducing health care costs.
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2. Modeling Details
2.1 Regular Clinic or Office mode of care
Before the introduction of mHealth assume a single
doctor operating a clinic. She receives payment based
on fee for service. Let the reimbursement be given by
p for every office visit. In addition to this
reimbursement, as a token of serving her patient’s
needs, we assume the doctor receives a share of the
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patient utility for every patient he serves. This might
be a notional feel-good effect of making a patient
healthier and better and is therefore independent of
number of visits. We assume a linear gain in utility and
let the utility per patient be given by 𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢 . (List of
notations is provided in Table 1)
We assume the clinic serves different kinds of
patients and the total patient panel size is N. For
simplicity we will classify patients into high-risk and
low-risk patients with arrival rates λ𝐻𝐻 and λ𝐿𝐿
respectively. These arrivals are over and above the
regular periodic visits that the patients are expected to
see the doctor for. Let h denote the proportion of highrisk patients in a panel size of N. The high-risk patients
have a higher arrival rate (frequent measure of vitals,
etc.), that is λ𝐻𝐻 > λ𝐿𝐿 . In our initial analysis, we do not
assume a priority system in place for clinic operations.
Hence the clinic sees a combined arrival rate and the
case-mix does not actually play a role.
Table 1: List of Notations:
Reimbursement Model
𝑁𝑁 = Panel size
𝑝𝑝 = the reimbursement for every office visit
µ = the physician service rate
𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢 = the utility per patient (the doctor receives a
share of the utility for every patient he serves)
c = reputation cost of making a patient wait in the
system for one unit of time
𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜 , 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚 = Total average arrival rate for a panel size N
for regular mode and mHealth mode
n = Expected arrival rate per patient
h = the proportion of high-risk patients in a panel
size of N
λ𝐻𝐻 = arrival rate of high-risk patients
λ𝐿𝐿 = arrival rate of low-risk patients (λ𝐻𝐻 > λ𝐿𝐿 )
T = Maximum Average delay to get an appointment
Capitation Model
pc = capitation payment per patient per period
m = number of clinical staff
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 = payroll cost per period per staff
k1µ = new physician service rate
𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠 = service rate of clinic staff
k2𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚 = the total arrival rate (referral rate) to the
doctor
Let the total average arrival rate for a panel size of
N and a case-mix ratio h be given by 𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜 = λ𝐻𝐻 + λ𝐿𝐿 .
Since the arrival rate will be a function of the panel
size, we have 𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜 (𝑁𝑁) = λ(ℎ𝑁𝑁) + λ�(1 − ℎ)𝑁𝑁�.
Patients incur a disutility (cost) of traveling to the
clinic (monetary or otherwise) for every visit and the
corresponding share for the doctor can be combined
with any marginal cost for the clinic per visit. We can

then normalize the combined cost to zero. We assume
that the clinic is expected to provide an appointment to
patients within T days on average. Based on the
expected standard time for a clinic visit and a
dedicated time for non-periodic visits, let the service
rate be given by µ. (Note: This implicitly means that
the service rate µ is determined exogenously. The
randomness comes from variation in day to day clinic
operations.)
The doctor decides on an optimal panel size such
that the net revenue for the specialist is maximized.
The net revenue per period for the doctor is then given
by
𝑐𝑐
𝜆𝜆
𝜋𝜋(N, 𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜 ) = 𝑝𝑝 𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜 + 𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢 𝑁𝑁 −
𝜇𝜇 − 𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜
1
≤ 𝑇𝑇 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡.
𝜇𝜇 − 𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜
𝜇𝜇 > 𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜

Note that we do not consider the revenue from
regular visits in the net revenue function. In
expectation terms, this is a fixed amount per period
and hence will not change the result of the
𝑐𝑐
can be seen as
optimization problem. The term
𝜇𝜇− 𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜

the cost of reputation if the clinic is very congested
with severe appointment delays. We note that the
optimal solution will be the same even if we consider
only the waiting time (in contrast to the total time)
since the service rate is fixed.
If we assume 𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜 to simply be a factor of N (rather
than a function of N), that is, each patient is expected
to see the doctor n times a year (over and above the
periodic “maintenance” visits), we can simplify the net
revenue function further and identify the optimal panel
size. If we assume 𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜 = 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, then the solution to the
optimization problem is as follows.
Proposition 1: Let 𝑁𝑁 ∗ denote the optimal panel size. If
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢 <

𝑐𝑐(1+𝜇𝜇)2
𝜇𝜇 3

,

then 𝑁𝑁 ∗ = 0.
𝜇𝜇

𝑛𝑛 𝑐𝑐 𝑇𝑇 2 𝜇𝜇, then 𝑁𝑁 ∗ = −
𝑐𝑐𝜇𝜇

�𝑛𝑛 (𝑛𝑛 𝑝𝑝+ 𝑝𝑝 ).
𝑢𝑢

𝑛𝑛

1

𝑇𝑇 𝑛𝑛

If 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢 ≥
𝜇𝜇

. Otherwise, 𝑁𝑁 ∗ = −
𝑛𝑛

The proof follows from concavity of the objective
function and first order conditions. The details are
given in the appendix. The first condition ensures that
the participation constraint for the provider is satisfied.
The second part of the proposition pertains to the case
when the service level constraint is binding.
2.2 Clinic operations with mHealth
In this section we explore if and when the doctor
would adopt mHealth. We use the optimal panel size
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that is in effect before the introduction of mHealth.
Given this panel size we optimize the clinic operations
(that is, staff level). We then compare the two net
revenues in both the modes of care and derive
conditions under which mHealth mode is beneficial
for the clinic. We identify the range of parameter
values where it is optimal to introduce mHealth. Later
on we also investigate how the optimal panel size will
change with the introduction of mHealth.
Since there are currently limitations with respect to
reimbursement for mHealth visits, we explore a
capitation-based model in which the doctor gets
reimbursed every period for each patient in her panel
size. To start with we will assume there are bonuses
and/or penalties based on patient health and the
payment is conditional on some minimum
expectations. We will assume that the doctor satisfies
these minimum expectations to obtain the capitation
payment 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 . In the base model we do not identify the
optimal penalties and bonuses. We assume them to be
exogenous and fixed. This will help us focus on the
optimal operation of the clinic for a panel size
identified before mHealth adoption.
In order to manage the operations, the doctor
employs a few clinical staff. These clinical staff play
an active disease management role and they are not
simply administrators managing appointments. Their
roles could be providing ancillary services (e.g.,
dieticians), monitoring vitals, etc. Let the payroll cost
per period per staff be given by of 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 and the number
of clinical staff be denoted by m.
We also assume sequential mode of care where all
patients are first monitored by clinical staff. On a need
basis the clinical staff ask the patients to schedule an
appointment with the doctor or put a referral. (Note:
Alternatively, if there is an efficient routing system in
place that automatically routes arrivals to the
appropriate server, the care delivery could be done in
parallel instead of sequential.) The mHealth mode of
care delivery may potentially increase the efficiency
of the doctor since most of the medical service will be
provided by her staff and her role will be more of a
supervisory role. On the other hand, the doctor may
now only deal with sicker and complicated patients
after getting triaged by her staff. Dealing with these
patients may be difficult and consume more time. We
let the new service rate for clinic visits be k1µ, where
𝑘𝑘1 <> 1. Let the service rate of clinic staff be given
by 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠.
Even though the arrival rate to the clinic will vary
according to the patient-type, case-mix ratio h, and
patient panel size N, the arrival rate to the doctor will
be lower, as much of the treatment can be managed by
the clinic staff. Let the total arrival rate (referral rate)
to the doctor be given by k2 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚 , where 𝑘𝑘2 < 1.

Given the capitation model and a fixed panel size,
since payments are fixed, it is enough if we focus on
the cost per period of clinic operations for
optimization. However, for the sake of consistency,
we work with the net revenue as given by
𝑐𝑐
𝑘𝑘 𝜆𝜆 − 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑚𝑚
𝑘𝑘1 𝜇𝜇 − 𝑘𝑘2 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚 2 𝑚𝑚
− 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚 𝑊𝑊(𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚 , 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠 , 𝑚𝑚)

𝜋𝜋𝑚𝑚 (N, 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚 , 𝑚𝑚) = 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 𝑁𝑁 −
𝑐𝑐

where 𝑊𝑊(𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚 , 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠 , 𝑚𝑚) has a similar connotation to
and represents the congestion cost related to the

𝜇𝜇− 𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜

clinic staff. We use the following approximation for
the waiting time in queue
𝜌𝜌�2(𝑚𝑚+1)
𝑊𝑊(𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚 , 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠 , 𝑚𝑚) =
𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚 (1 − 𝜌𝜌)
𝜆𝜆
where 𝜌𝜌 = 𝑚𝑚 [11].
𝑚𝑚𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠

In this case the doctor needs to pick the optimal
staff size m. The clinic will then solve the following
optimization problem, assuming 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚 = 𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚 𝑁𝑁.
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀m 𝜋𝜋𝑚𝑚 (N, 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚 (𝑁𝑁), 𝑚𝑚)
𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡. 𝑊𝑊(𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚 (N), 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠 , 𝑚𝑚) ≤ 𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚 ,
𝑚𝑚 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠 > 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚 (N)

Again, we assume that the staff are expected to
provide a response (intervention) to patients within 𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚
days on average. The stability constraints and the
service level constraints for the provider are not
included in the optimization problem since they are
not dependent on the staff size m. However, they are
very much relevant and are assumed to be satisfied by
the parameter values in the optimization problem.
Specifically, the optimization problem is only valid if
1
≤ 𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚 and 𝑘𝑘1 𝜇𝜇 > 𝑘𝑘2 λ(N).
𝑘𝑘1 𝜇𝜇− 𝑘𝑘2 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚 (N)

3. Numerical analysis

3.1 Choice of parameters in the base case
Consider the period to be a day. Two visits is the
average number of additional visits to the clinic per
patient per year. Assuming the doctor spends about 20
minutes with each patient and is available for 7 hours
a day and the doctor allocates 20% of his time to
urgent or non-periodic visits, service rate is then 𝜇𝜇 =
4.2 patients per day. We will assume twice the regular
rate for the clinical staff on average. 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠 = 42 patients
per day. Assume payroll cost, 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 , to be 200 dollars per
day per staff (based on an annual salary of 73,000
dollars). We assume 𝑝𝑝 = $50 per visit, 𝑛𝑛 = 2/365,
that is, two non-regular visits per patient per year,
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𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢 = 1 per patient per day, 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 = $2 per patient per
day, 𝑘𝑘1 = 1, 𝑘𝑘2 = 0.02, 𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 = 5 per day, 𝑇𝑇 = 5
days, and 𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚 = 1 day, 𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚 = 1/7, that is, mobile apps
are used at least once a week by patients. Since 𝑘𝑘2 =
0.02, only 2% of these mobile uploads are referred to
the doctor.
3.2 Pre-mHealth case
For the base case the optimal panel size is found to
be 711 and the total net revenue is 842 per day. We
next explore how sensitive the optimal panel size is
with respect to the service level requirement T in
Figure 1. We observe that even though the service
level constraint is relaxed (higher T), the optimal panel
size only increases marginally (for 𝑇𝑇 > 4). This is due
to the importance the provider gives for her reputation
determined by the congestion in her clinic. The
behavior of the net revenue is similar.

Clinics should be wary of such patient behavior during
the transition phase.
Figure 3 shows the difference in net revenue for
different values of the average service rate of clinical
staff. The difference in revenue increases with the
efficiency of care delivery. Due to the continuous
nature of treatment plan, care delivery through
mHealth can become efficient and can become patientcentric. With patient-specific data to guide treatment
plans, efficiency in care delivery could lead to higher
revenue in the case of mHealth. In the base case the
service rate of clinic staff is at twice the regular rate of
the doctor. While this rate is enough to lead to a higher
profit, we also note that further efficiency increase has
decreasing returns on the profit.
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Figure 2: Difference in Total Net Revenue vs.
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Figure 1: Optimal Panel Size vs. Maximum
Average Delay for Appointment
3.3 mHealth case
For the base case scenario, the optimal staff size for
mHealth mode is 2.7 and the net revenue is 844 per
day. The optimal m is also linearly increasing with n𝑚𝑚 .
We next analyze scenarios or parameter values where
the mHealth mode generates more net revenue than the
regular office mode.
Figure 2 shows the difference in net revenue for
different values of the average number of uploads per
patient. We can observe a cut-off value beyond which
mHealth mode fares worse than the regular mode. For
the base case in Figure 2 we observe that the cut-off
value is just above once a week. While the benefit of
mHealth comes from the clinical support staff
managing most of the care, unexpectedly, mHealth
could also make patients seek care more often as the
access to health providers becomes easier. If so, then
mHealth could potentially increase the load on the
clinic, requiring additional staff capacity and hence the
net revenue might be lower than that of regular mode.

Difference in Profit
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Figure 3: Difference in Total Net Revenue vs.
Average Service Rate of Clinic Staff
Figure 4 shows the difference in net revenue for
different values of the capitation fee per patient. We
can observe a cut-off value only beyond which
mHealth mode fares better than the regular mode. This
reinforces the key reason why doctors hesitate to
venture into mHealth. Even under capitation-based
models, if the reimbursement provided to the doctors
are insufficient, the incentive to adopt mHealth
reduces and the providers would prefer the regular
mode of care and a fee-for-service regime. Policy
makers need to structure the payments carefully to
provide proper incentives for mHealth.
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Figure 4: Difference in Total Net Revenue vs.
Capitation payment per patient
Figure 5 shows the difference in net revenue for
different values of the average service rate of the
doctor. We can observe a cut-off value beyond which
mHealth mode becomes feasible and fares better than
the regular mode. As the service rate increases, the
optimal panel size also increases and hence the impact
of mHealth increases as well. Similar to our discussion
under clinic staff, the availability of regular patientspecific data in the mHealth mode can make care
delivery pertinent and efficient. Patients taking control
of their health also play a role in increasing the
efficiency of the provider.
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Figure 5: Difference in Total Net Revenue vs.
Average Service Rate of Provider
We also analyze how the clinic can choose the
optimal panel size in the case of mHealth mode.
Finally, we also investigate the differential impact of
case-mix on the mHealth mode operations.

4. Discussion and Conclusion
Continuous care management has been strongly
recommended to decrease the costs associated with
chronic care. Healthcare technology including mobile
technology can greatly aid in this regard. They can also
help in patient-specific care management. In this
research we show the conditions under which clinics
can adopt mHealth.
While mHealth has shown a lot of promise in
patient data collection and giving patient more control,

one must also consider the role of providers in the
adoption of mHealth. It adds significant burden to the
specialists and without proper reimbursement
initiatives the benefits of mHealth may not be fully
realized. Our analysis brings out the benefits for
providers using mHealth. In addition to identifying the
key parameters that will influence the adoption of
mHealth, our analysis helps in exploring the trade‐offs
for providers (clinics or physicians) in offering
mHealth to its patients. We explore if the government
and private insurance companies should play a role for
mHealth to be successful and whether such moves will
increase social welfare.
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7. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The objective function is
concave in N since
2𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛3 𝑁𝑁
2𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛2
𝑑𝑑 2 𝜋𝜋
=−
−
<0
2
3
(𝜇𝜇 − 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)2
(𝜇𝜇 − 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)
𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁
Therefore, we can use the first-order conditions to
identify the optimal N. The first-order condition yields
𝜇𝜇

two roots: � −
𝜇𝜇

𝑛𝑛

+

𝑛𝑛

�𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛3 (𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢 )𝜇𝜇 𝜇𝜇

�𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛3 (𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢 )𝜇𝜇
𝑛𝑛2 (𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢)

𝑛𝑛2 (𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢 )

, +
𝑛𝑛

�𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛3 (𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢 )𝜇𝜇
𝑛𝑛2 (𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛+𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢)

�. Since

is infeasible (the second constraint

which refers to system stability is not satisfied), only
the other root is possible. Only the boundary
conditions need to be checked namely, the service
constraint and the non-negative objective function.
The proposition then follows.
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